I think what interested me most in this week’s reading was Chapter 9 revolving around the ‘Jewish Question’. What struck me immediately was the parallel that Kershaw lays out between Germans’ overall enthusiasm and support for the expansion of Germany’s borders for ‘Living-Space’, though simultaneously they wanted to avoid war and the role of anti-Semitism in that though anti-Semitism was rampant among Germans before Hitler attained power, but these attitudes “did not remotely match the anti-Jewish paranoia of Hitler” (230). Though from 1933 on Hitler predominantly had a tight grip over the masses with the use of the Fuhrer Myth, he was never able to raise support or enthusiasm for the level of anti-Semitism in which he harbored, which in the end resulted in the Holocaust.
Though maybe this isn’t a new revelation for the class, being that Kershaw had discussed in his other book how Hitler would omit anti-Semitism from his speeches many times because of the audience he was addressing, I think it’s eye opening in that anti-Semitism is the overriding and predominant factor Hitler is remembered for. It’s interesting how Kershaw maps out the fluctuation in the anti-Semitic rhetoric in Hitler’s speeches. Between 1920 and 1922 it was a major theme of all of his speeches and publications, but by late 1922, anti-Marxism replaced anti-Semitism as the dominant theme, which Kershaw argues is “a conscious attempt to attune to (a) wider audience” (231). Kershaw furthers his argument that between 1929 and 1930 when the party gained most of its support, anti-Semitism didn’t play a major role and during the Nazis’ consolidation of power between 1933 and 1934, Hitler didn’t mention the ‘Jewish Question’ at all in any speeches. Even in his public image he made sure to “distance himself from the unpopular anti-Jewish terror of the Nazi mobs” (236) even though he strongly agreed with their actions. True Hitler was smart, but what I find most disturbing is that he was so calculating, he worked to find a fine balance between the majority of the public’s “secondary interest” (245) in the ‘Jewish Question’ and his uncontrollable, vicious obsession with it.
True, as Kershaw lays out, there is a distinction between the image Hitler was portraying to the population and the image he was relaying to members of the Nazi movement “where his ‘mission’ to destroy the Jews functioned as a symbolic motivating force for the Party and SS” (251), but this still leaves unanswered questions. Anti-Semitism was, as Kershaw concludes, “of only secondary importance in cementing the bonds between the Fuhrer and people” (250) and yes, most citizens under the regime were in favor anti-Jewish policies where Jews were excluded from society, but mass extermination was still taboo. Were Germans so deeply persuaded that Jews were responsible for all of Germany’s problems including the war that they just stood by and let the ‘Final Solution’ occur? On page 249, Kershaw emphasizes that the fate of the Jews was “an unpleasant topic…discussions of the fate of the Jews were discouraged” (249). Did Germans simply put the horrifying truth of the regime and the actions they were carrying out against the Jews out of their heads and stand by idly as though nothing out of the ordinary was occurring?
I was likewise intrigued with Chapter 9 concerning the Jewish Question, mostly because I think it is of paramount importance to try to understand how Hitler did it, moreover how the German populous stood by and watched as it all unfolded, particularly the fact that it could happen. Kershaw makes great strides at trying to grasp the circumstances surrounding the German people, noting how the Jewish Question, for many, was of secondary importance. Kershaw continuously aims to show how a detachment from reality when it came to Hitler and how the people perceived him, a view fueled by the ‘Hitler Myth’, existed. Considering Kershaw’s arguments and evidence, I can’t help but wonder if maybe the people really didn’t understand the extent of Hitler’s solution to the ‘Jewish Question.’ As this post points out, Hitler was very calculating, especially in distancing himself from the ‘Jewish Question.’ The Nazi Party and Hitler both went to great lengths to paint a certain picture of the ‘Jewish Question’, as Kershaw states, “There was much deliberate or subliminal exclusion of the treatment of the Jews from popular consciousness,” (249). Moreover, whenever Hitler’s speeches did contain explicit aims at the Jewish population, many people disregarded his comments “as stereotype repetition,” (245). In scheme of everything, I think the German people didn’t, or perhaps couldn’t, gauge the severity of what was really going on concerning the Jewish people. What they were told, the news they could read, the reality of it all seems to have been so constructed and so confining, that I think they only slowly understood what was really happening, and maybe by the time they did, it was too late to actually do anything because by then not supporting the Reich was deadly. Also, they trusted Hitler, had fully invested belief in him, and were perhaps blinded by this loyalty to comprehend what he was really doing about the ‘Jewish Question.’ As Kershaw repeatedly notes, the Hitler who was and the Hitler they all perceived, were distinct, and this distinction was ever so deceptive.
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ReplyDeleteI think German people’s general indifferent towards the Jewish question can be explained by their trust in Hitler. Hitler’s propaganda in idolizing himself as the ultimate savior or Germany allowed for him to sweep away people’s ability to think and to question the validity of his ideologies. It is difficult to come to a conclusion as to why the Germans failed to break away from the anti-Semitic spell that Hitler had casted; so perhaps one reason is that such following was only successfully engendered by appealing to the emotional and irrational side of human nature, one which desperately called for solutions, during times of dire conflicts. Hitler pointed to the Jews as the root of all problems and the Germans unconditionally believed it. It wasn’t that they did not want to do anything to stop outrageous anti Semitism, it was that, because they were manipulated into having such deeply rooted trust in Hitler’s agenda, they didn’t see anything wrong with it.
ReplyDeleteInteresting to note, also as Kershaw has pointed out, was the development of Hitler’s changing emphasis on the Jewish question and its correlation with his rise to, and maintenance of power. During Golden Ages, because Germany’s recovery seemed promising, what Hitler said about the Jews remained nonsense and was taken seriously by only few. Yet as a result of the adverse impact of the Great Depression, as mounting unemployment rates instilled hopelessness in people, Hitler's search for a scapegoat proved a lot more fruitful. Then after Hitler became chancellor in January 1933, the Jewish question became increasingly relevant, as Hitler was no longer concerned with disguising or minimizing his anti-Semitic agenda in order to gain appeal especially since Hitler, aware of the power of Jewish money, had intentionally left out anti-Semitic comments from his speeches during elections.