The Irony of "Myth" and Politics.

This week the irony of the relationship between the “Hitler myth” and politics became apparent. During the transformation of the myth from that of Hitler as a ‘party leader’ to the ‘symbol of the nation’ two things became apparent. Firstly, Hitler had become completely attached to the excessive ‘Furher cult’. Kershaw argues that between 1933-35 “Hitler still saw the cult constructed around his persona largely as... ‘a vehicle for the stupefication of the masses’”. Yet by 1936 testimonies of Dietrich and Diels point toward the growing “messianic” and “quasi-religious” self-image of Hitler, following the successful re-occupation of the Rhineland. (82) Secondly, there became a growing disparity between the popularity of Hitler and that of the NSDAP. As reactions to the ‘Meiser affair’ during the “Church struggle” indicate “the Fuhrer was, in fact, scarcely drawn into criticism at all” and his “own image was completely detached from the negative image of the party.” (116)

Hence, it can be concluded that Hitler was thought to be unaware of the daily struggles between local leadership and the populus. In this way his detachment from the people by way of a deified image spared him any perceived implication in the domestic troubles. This can be seen as a double-edges sword, however, since the detachment of his image away from internal politics implied a focus on the belief in his success in foreign policy.

From 1936 to 1939 Hitler did manage to achieve success in this sphere. After the reoccupation of the Rhineland in 1936 provoked only verbal retributions from the west, and the Anschluss made it “plain that the western powers were again prepared to stand by and do nothing,” (130) the popular image of Hitler as a non-violent demi-god was reinforced and made the people believe that “the Fuhrer can do everything he wants to” (132). Hence, the myth of the ‘genius statesman’ was consolidated.

With the initial successes of occupying France, Poland, Belguim and parts of Scandinavia in the war, the “Hitler myth” came to encompass the image of Hitler as a ‘military genius’ (155). Thus, by the summer of 1940, for the first time during the war, there was a prevailing “war mood” among the public, which was even rather disappointed by Hitler’s ‘final’ peace offer and could “hardly wait for the attack (on Britain) to start.” (156) Consequently, this clearly shows the “function of the ‘Fuhrer myth’ in deflecting from ‘everyday’ concerns and in bolstering the basis of support for the regime.” (157)

However, with the coming of the war and the incorporation of the ‘military genius’ aspect into the ‘Fuhrer myth’ there were two fatal consequences to the myth. Firstly, “Hitler was increasingly the war-lord, at first seein in a positive and ‘heroic’ sense, but later more and more in terms of unyielding, scarcely human harshness...”(181) Thus Hitler’s image became detached from the woes of the people, making him more prone to criticism of domestic issues (ie the ‘crucifix action’p.178). Secondly, the ‘military’ aspect of his perceived genius made him accountable for the considerable defeat on the Eastern front (ie Stalingrad p.189).

Conclusively it can be said that there is an ironic interrelationship between the creation and the lifespan of the ‘Fuhrer myth,’ and politics. The myth was based on the idea of the Nazi “movement,” not just a political revolt. Hence, the consolidation of the ‘Hitler myth’ came more as an apolitical and quasi-religious form of the greater “movement”. This is what protected Hitler’s image from the degenerating image of the party on the local level, yet what also concentrated the sustainability of the myth upon “greater” achievements in foreign policy. Hitler became known as military and statesman genius. Defeat in both these spheres brought the demise of the myth as well.