A point that I found particularly interesting was that Kershaw writes that “Feder’s idea on ‘interest slavery’ … [enabled Hitler] to rationalize and confirm his long standing prejudice with a ‘scholarly’ type argument” and that “[Hitler] did not see emotional anti-semitism as the answer.” This is because when I think of Nazi’s treatment of the Jewish people I always thought that it must have been hatred that drove their actions. However, the way that Nazi’s and Hitler ‘sold’ their views to their audiences was based on an argument based on reason and logic (although this ‘ logic’ was incredibly flawed and fabricated). This is all the more unsettling to think because we usually associate reason and logic as proponents of truth and the right ideas but this shows us that it can very easily be used as a false propaganda weapon as well. This proved particularly effective with a German (particularly Munich) population that was very receptive to the concept of anti-semitism.
One of the curious things that I found is how much support Hitler’s message of anti-Semitism received amongst wide range of people. For example some of Hitler’s foremost associates early on came from a wide range of professions; David Eckart was a poet, Gottfried Feder was an economist and Captain Mayr was a soldier. The wide range of profession show that anti-Semitism was certainly not confined to a specific part of society. In addition, the message of anti-semitism also appealed to people from a wide range of classes. We can see that Hitler’s message appealed to those in the privileged class as shown by the fact that Hitler and Hitler supporters were able to generate enough money to buy the newspaper the Volkischer Beobachter from their wealthy backers. The message of anti-semitism also appealed to the middle/lower class citizens as well with many of them showing up to listen to Hitler at his ‘Beer Hall’ rallies. If we think to the current American Society, we can hardly think of a subject that such a wide range of people can agree on. The fact that this point rallied so many different people makes it a lot easier to understand how the Nazi’s were able to generate the kind of support that eventually gave them power in Germany.
I agree that the mention of a "scholarly" type argument stuck out during my reading. The fact that it was not a hatred driven by emotion or any real basis at all is strange, not that that would have made the hatred any more legitimate. The way you phrased the spread of Hitler and the Nazis view as "selling" is a perfect way to describe it. Due to the fact that they believed their political view was more than just an emotion, people identified with it. The logic that they used, however ridiculous it was, must have seemed legitimate to the German people. This is especially true because of who was doing the campaigning and supporting, as you mentioned. The fact that people from every social class and profession were putting their faith in Hitler makes it difficult for a person to question it. It was also interesting to read that Captain Mayr had ordered Hitler to join the party, rather than him volunteering at his own will. Kershaw even mentions that Hitler may not have been known at all if he was not "spotted" by Mayr.
ReplyDeleteI agree with the author of the post that it is hard to justify Hitler’s strong ideal of anti-Semitism. I feel like people often try to find an answer as to how one individual could have such barbaric feelings towards Jewish people. Also I would have to agree that the Nazi Party and Hitler’s use of propaganda had true purpose. Even though the facts behind the propaganda weren’t true, it was very logical of the Nazi party to use this technique. The purpose of propaganda is to be effective in convincing people of all different income backgrounds to join together to support one cause, and the Nazi party did a brilliant job at that. I find the fact that people from every class level could relate to the party is very monumental. If you think about our own political system today, there isn’t a true view that supports everyone.
ReplyDeleteNazism’s widespread appeal also stood out to me during the reading. In Germany, Nazism seemed to be a uniting factor among people in the several different political parties and varying socioeconomic backgrounds. I think this was mostly because of Germany’s “atmosphere of disintegration and collapsing morale,” and “climate of political and ideological radicalization” (101). Clearly, Germany was ready for a major change in political, economic, and social structure after their defeat in WWI. Starvation due to little economic success was weakening morale in the community, and political unrest led to small but violent civil wars. I think that an ordinary politician would have been unsuccessful coming in to Germany in this current state—if a politician similar to the ones that Germany had dealt with before had come to power, how would the German people know that things were going to change? It took someone as radical and passionate about his beliefs as Hitler to appeal to the struggling German people.
ReplyDeleteThat anti-Semitism was able to appeal to so much of the German people is indeed a strange phenomenon—especially in light of the US-DE comparison in the post, “we can hardly think of a subject that such a wide range of people can agree on”. I think that wide range of disagreement was one factor (of many, of course) that, within the socio-political context of Germany at the time, allowed for such an outrageous belief to become popularized.
ReplyDeleteGermany during the end and after the war was in a sorry state full of its own internal conflicts. The results of the Versailles Treaty was a symbolic, disheartening loss for Germany and its nationalism; the country was defeated and in an economic crisis, unemployment was high, and there was much internal political conflict between the disorganized parties, especially in the left. (Kershaw argues that the murders of Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg “[sealed] the disastrous rift within the working-class movement”—I think that the fragmented left and their inability to re-establish power and control set the grounds for the rise of the NSDP (111).) That neither the left nor right was supportive of the establishment of the Weimar Republic, I think, is important in denoting the internal political conflicts that left Germany in a state of disorganization and serious discontent—Kershaw calls the pre-Nazi Germany a society of “fickle and shifting allegiances” in a time of “political confusion and opportunism” (119).
Around 1922/3 the conservative right-wingers could then argue for the poor and unhappy German masses that the Democracy established from the outside was an imposition. Again, because other parties could not organize—given their own conflicts—to nominate a leader to rule without Parliamentary consent, it was easy for the NSDP to step up with its majority and appoint Hitler. In this sorry state, a charismatic leader like Hitler came to fill in the role as Führer and the ideology first of anti-Democracy and then of the Volksgemeinschaft could be implemented (with heavy propaganda, naturally) to a susceptible, unstable, and turbulent German people. Were the Germans victors of the war and its people not so lost, perhaps its internal politics could have been more stable and its people not so desperate to resist the NSDP’s easy rise to power.